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Appellate Panels of One
Saul Levmore

Introduction
Appellate review can be understood as an opportunity to correct errors made by lower courts and,
by virtue of their multi-member panels, as a way to benefit from the wisdom of crowds. Appellate
panels of three judges, and then a larger Supreme Court of nine, are likely to interpret, apply, or
advance law more correctly, or simply better, than a single lower-court judge whose effort is under
review.1 Appellate review can also be understood as relying on more experienced or otherwise
superior decision-makers or as designed to make law more uniform, inasmuch as lower court
decisions on many matters will converge as they follow precedents. It has also been understood as
a way to take advantage of the knowledge that litigants themselves have about lower court errors. 2
Appellate review is surely a means of encouraging more careful work by lower courts; people are
often more careful when they know that their work can be reviewed or observed by superiors or
well-regarded peers. Finally, appellate review may be of great value (even) when it affirms a lower
court, because each step adds to the development of a lasting precedent. Most of these perspectives
have counterparts in other settings where the familiar question of when to seek and pay for a second
opinion arises. But most second opinions, whether sought before agreeing to a medical procedure
or contracting for an auto repair, are given by a single analyst, while appellate review in the federal
and most state systems normally involves three jurists, and then yet more in the event of a further
appeal.3 This Essay examines the logic of second and third opinions – even without the added
complexity introduced by the precise cost of review (in the form of time or money) – and reaches
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1

Error correction, uniformity of law, and a redirection of the role of the Supreme Court are thought to
explain the Evarts Act, and the creation of the U.S. Federal Courts of Appeal in 1891, not to mention the
growth – in number, size, and caseloads – of these appellate courts. See Chapter 1, A Brief History of the
Circuit Courts in William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2012). Error correction – whether in federal or state courts – is the
goal pursued here, though uniformity and other aims can be understood as compatible with correct
decisions. The meaning of “correct” is discussed in Part IV. When decisions are viewed as correct,
precedential value and uniformity become especially attractive.
2

Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995).

3

When private parties opt for arbitration, they are not aiming for something equivalent to appellate review.
They usually deploy one or three arbitrators, and none of the players is establishing judicial precedents. In
the comventional legal system, the costs of appellate review is partly borne by the government and might
overused (or overused), but the optimal rate of review is not the subject here.
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several counterintuitive results. Most appellate processes should be restructured so that one judge
alone reviews the lower court. Only if this single appellate judge disagrees with the lower court,
should one more judge enter the fray, and even that may be wasteful. Legal questions that are
appealed will normally be decided by 2-0 or 2-1 decisions, involving just one or two appellate
judges in addition to the lower court judge.
There are other reasonable conclusions to reach once the logic of appellate review, and second
opinions quite generally, is examined. There is a case to be made for having the first appellate
judge always decide whether further review is in order. On the other hand, and to the contrary, the
appellate process could always stop after one review – subject to the Supreme Court’s deciding to
take the case. These and other possibilities are examined here, but mostly set aside in favor of the
central argument about the appellate process. The arguments that drive the conclusions are fueled
by some probability theory, and have surprising implications for areas outside of law in which
second opinions are commonly sought. I begin with the idea that reaching the correct decision
(defined presently) is the immediate goal. As the argument proceeds, the value of long-lasting rules
and other aims are brought into play.
Part I begins with the most familiar use of second opinions. It rethinks the wisdom of soliciting
another assessment before following a recommendation regarding a serious medical intervention.
There are important differences between medical and legal decisions, but it is instructive to begin
with an example where it is easier to insist that there is a correct answer. The analysis shows that
the common thinking about the value of a second medical opinion is poorly conceived. The goal
in Part I is not to give medical advice, though there is some of that, but to rethink the logic of
second opinions, before applying it to judicial review. Part II then takes account of some of the
ways in which judicial review is unlike other calls for review. It suggests that if we incorporate the
likelihood that a lower court judge is correct, it is sensible to move to a system where we begin,
and usually end, with a single appellate judge. Part III tests the idea of a single reviewer by looking
not only at the value of discussion and teamwork among judges, but also at the importance of some
assumptions made here about the probability that a judge is correct. Part IV turns to the possibility
that appellate judges are not deployed to find correct answers, perhaps because there is often no
such thing, but rather to reflect and aggregate preferences, a distinction familiar to students of
public choice, not to mention to observers who regard much of what judges do as reflecting
political preferences. Part V extends the analysis of appellate review to committees and boards of
directors, and then to juries. The insights offered here suggest some changes in law, though some
of these are likely to be politically impossible in the near future.
I.

Second Opinions

When a second opinion can be obtained from someone who is much more likely to be correct than
the first analyst, it is a good investment to acquire that second opinion unless it is relatively costly
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when compared to the importance of the decision to be made. It is, for example, common for an
ailing individual to go to a nearby and readily available doctor, but if that professional suspects
that there might be a serious problem, he or she will normally recommend a specialist in the area
of concern. We can think of this specialist as the first well-informed decision-maker, because in
modern times it is unusual for the family doctor or gate-keeper to move ahead with a serious
intervention without consultation. Things are different in law because the first, or lower court,
judge is often as specialized as an appellate judge. In medicine, if the gate-keeper recommends an
average specialist, but more experienced and skilled specialists are available, then it is obvious
that opinions by two specialists might wisely be sought. If the first specialist is 70% likely to be
correct in recommending for or against a serious and invasive procedure, but a true expert is 90%
likely to be correct, then the value of the second opinion is apparent, and especially so if the first
recommends something drastic. Indeed, many health insurance companies encourage, or require
and pay for, second opinions in specified circumstances.4 There is an equilibrium. When a 90%
(probability of being correct) second opinion will be available, it is less important to have a highly
skilled first opinion. From a systemic perspective, it can be efficient to train a larger set of simply
competent first responders.5 Correspondingly, law sometimes pairs a low-cost first decision-maker
with a single, and presumably superior, reviewer, who can affirm, modify, or overturn the first. A
magistrate’s decision is normally reviewed by a single, Article III, judge, much as work by a new
associate at a law firm is reviewed by a more experienced attorney. The magistrate comparison is
imperfect if only because magistrates, along with hearing officers and arbitrators, are often used
as factfinders in settings where it is expensive or impossible for later reviewers to access the same
facts. But the larger point is that law already uses first responders who can be reviewed by a single
party, thought to be more likely to be correct, when it comes to interpreting and applying law to
the facts. Here, as in most of the discussion that follows, it is assumed or understood that (in
addition to factfinding) law is looking for a correct answer, rather than for the preferences or
political inclinations of a judge regarding the interpretation and application of statutes, precedents,
the common law, or constitutional provisions. These are not the only two things that law might be

4

Robert B. Grant, Outpatient Surgery: Helping to Contain Health Care Costs, 115 MONTHLY LABOR REV.
33, 34 (1992) (explaining that insurance cost-containment measures include requiring second opinions for
specific surgical procedures, and reducing coverage where participants do not seek a second opinion).
5

The efficiency claim runs in both directions. The better the appellate court, the more efficient it is to invest
less in the lower court. On the other hand, the more we can save costs by having a good lower court, or first
doctor, and then a smaller number of reviewers, as argued in this Article, the more sensible it is to invest in
good first responders. An additional complication is that while many of us are more careful when we know
we might be reviewed, there is the danger of sloppiness at step one because the worker knows that errors
are likely to be caught at the next step. This is likely to be a problem when the first worker is not identifiable.
In any event, the problem of duplicative review, in the form of suboptimal effort by a given participant,
does not appear to be present when judges are identifiable; lower court judges are more likely to fear
reversals than to count on appellate courts to correct their errors.

3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036778

trying to do, and the definition of “correct” is contestable, and addressed in Part IV. Again, most
of the discussion here does assume that there is a correct answer to be found.6
To simplify the analysis, imagine that specialist #1 recommends that a procedure be undertaken as
soon as possible. If the advice is correct, the patient will live or enjoy some other great benefit; if
it is incorrect, the medical intervention will lead to disaster. In order to avoid unnecessary
arithmetic here, I will imagine that the cost of being wrong matches the benefit of acquiring and
following correct advice. For further convenience, assume that the first specialist gives the correct
advice 2/3 of the time, and that this probability of a correct diagnosis is the same for any additional
specialists who will be consulted. This is a good assumption for the argument presented here, both
because it is difficult for the patient (or even a family physician) to know the probabilities to attach
to each specialist and because, returning to law, legal questions will normally be reviewed by
judges who are randomly assigned to panels, so we can imagine that the average rate of being
correct is 2/3 for each additional judge. If there is time and money (or no cost) to get additional
opinions before agreeing to an invasive procedure, the well-known “wisdom of crowds,” or
Condorcet Jury Theorem, prevails.7 The chance of error and a very bad outcome if the patient goes
to specialist #1 alone is 1/3. But if the patient goes to three specialists, whom we can refer to as
6

When judges are trying to be correct but there is simply no right answer to be found, and it is also not a
matter of preferences, it is easy to argue that fewer reviewers (at lower cost) are no worse than more.
7

Condorcet thought about jury trials where the defendant was either guilty or not. It is no accident that he
wrote at the time of the French Revolution and, indeed, Condorcet himself spent some time in hiding and
in prison during those turbulent times. See Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability—Ironies in the Evolution
of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L. Q., 975, 999-1000 (1998). Condorcet’s argument is
straightforward. If every juror, or voter, is (a) more likely than not to be correct, and (b) these jurors are
independent, so that there is no danger of an incorrect voter tarnishing the probability of others being
correct, then (c) as the number of voters increases, and (d) a majority voting rule is applied, the probability
of the group reaching the correct decision approaches 1. Here and throughout, the assumption is that the
decision-makers assess matters independently. The case of three voters is examined at length in note 9,
where it is clear that three are better than one. A 3-0 vote is then convenient. In a more extreme case,
imagine fifteen voters, be they jurors, judges, or doctors, with each having a probability of .6 of being
correct. With a majority rule, we need to find the probability that at least 8 will be right or, put differently,
we need to be concerned about any case in which more than 7 are wrong. With a unanimity rule, it is easy
to see that the chance that 15 out of 15 are wrong is extremely low (.4 to the 15 th power, or vastly less than
1%). It is also the case that a 15-0 correct decision, requiring every single juror to have a good day, is only
more likely than not when each juror is more than .95 likely to be right or when a correct, confident, or
charismatic juror simply browbeats others or is followed by them. Without compromise (a topic discussed
in Part V), most juries of substantial size will be hung under a true unanimity rule. But as for majority rule,
and returning to medical opinions, the chance of getting 8 or more incorrect doctors out of 15 doctors, each
with a 60-70% chance of being right, is about 21%. This is much better than the error rate assigned here to
the single doctor. It is easy to explain Condorcet (and his followers) nearly brushing aside this topic because
he was personally interested in unanimous jury decisions with the death penalty in view.
For a clear but also critical view of the Condorcet Jury Theorem as applied to law, see Paul H.
Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002) (finding
the theorem “unassailable” but critiquing some of its applications to legal questions).
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doctors #1, #2, and #3, and sensibly abides by a majority “vote,” as recommended by the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, there is an 8/27 chance that all will agree and be correct (2/3 x 2/3 x 2/3) and a 1/27
chance that all three doctors will be wrong ( 1/3 x 1/3 x 1/3). A 3-0 decision is thus reassuring and far
more likely to be correct than not, but it has not otherwise added anything to the decision-making
process. The patient might as well have saved time and money by following #1’s advice. The extra
opinions invoked the wisdom of crowds with a 3-0 vote, but in an important sense little or nothing
was gained, and of course the added doctors increase health care costs.
Return then to the value of going for that second opinion, rather than comparing three against one,
which is to say a unanimous (small) crowd against the individual assessor. If #2’s advice
contradicts that obtained from specialist #1, the patient has new information. Again, if #2 agrees
with #1, nothing practical is gained from this knowledge. The patient was willing to lose time and
money to get added comfort, but there is a negative impact on other people who could be helped
by the excess medical advice consumed by the first patient. Indeed, the ability of wealthier patients
to obtain second and third opinions, might explain part of the reason that wealth is correlated with
longevity. There is a case to be made for the government paying for second and third opinions for
less fortunate people, if the private market demonstrates that more privileged people pay for these
opinions when on their own.
Even when a patient finds that #2 agrees with #1, the patient might continue on to #3 (we might
conveniently assume that at that point money or time will run out) and obtain a 3-0 or 2-1 result
but, again, the patient could have stopped after getting #1’s advice. The benefit, in terms of actually
deciding whether to submit to the recommended medical intervention, must be in the case where
#2 disagrees with #1. If in the face of this 1-1 set of assessments, the patient is unsure how to
proceed, and so flips a coin, the patient is no better off than stopping after #1, and might just as
well have proceeded without seeking advice.8 As a practical matter, #2’s input might be favored,
because #2 can look for flaws in #1’s analysis, or build on the earlier work. This is a familiar
second-mover’s advantage, even if it is contrary to Condorcet’s technical preference for
independent judgments. But the discussion here tries to eliminate this debatable point, first by
assuming that #1 and #2 have the identical 2/3 chance of advising the patient correctly, and then
by appealing to many readers’ intuitions, and following the approach taken by Condorcet himself:
When each voter, or decision-maker, is more than 50% likely to be right, we must amalgamate
independent judgments in order to guarantee the theorem’s validity. The idea is not simply to
8

This may seem puzzling, inasmuch as the patient has useful information after #1 and then it is updated by
the acquisition of more information. How could the acquisition of information make someone worse off?
But there is no paradox, because the second piece of information taught the patient that what she thought
after hearing from #1 was not as reliable as it first seemed. The second piece could, after all, have confirmed
the first. Put differently, the conflict between #1 and #2 tells the patient to seek #3, if possible, and this is
informative. It remains true that going to #2 is pointless in terms of outcomes, unless it will be possible to
go to #3. Comparing “average accuracies,” as done presently in note 9, is statistically useful but sometimes
of no help to the patient.
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justify the aggregation of probabilities but, presumably, to avoid the danger of one person’s
mistake infecting another’s judgment. In the case of doctors, as with auto-repair shops, it is
common for patients who seek a second opinion to think it is more valuable when #2 is unaware
of #1’s assessment. On the other hand, and looking ahead to judges, the appellate court is normally
thought to benefit from having access to the lower court’s reasoning, not to mention the views of
fellow panel members. These contrasting intuitions form a subject returned to below.
At this point, the analysis appears to have generated two conclusions. First, when one is advised
to seek a second opinion, it is really a suggestion to be ready to seek a third – unless the second
opinion is to be acquired from a source significantly more likely to be correct than that which
produced the first opinion. If there will be no time to get a third opinion then, counterintuitively,
it is usually wasteful to solicit a second opinion. Even the idea that second opinions, in the case of
a medical intervention, might provide peace of mind is questionable, inasmuch as when #2
disagrees with #1, the patient is likely to be stressed. Second, and more striking, even when there
is time and money for two more opinions, one might as well forego the second opinion because
after a 1-1 split, the third opinion is no more likely to be right than the first. After a split opinion,
the patient is relying on the quality of #3, and by hypothesis this is identical to that already
contained in the advice previously received from #1. If the convenient assumption that each
decision-maker is equally (2/3) likely to be correct is unrealistic, it is sufficient to imagine (as
suggested earlier) that the patient has no way of knowing which doctor is superior. Looking ahead
to an analysis of legal decisions, an advantage of appellate review might be that an appellate judge
is more likely to be correct than the lower court judge, but there is no reason to think that a second
or third appellate judge is more likely to be right than a prior appellate judge. This is part of the
argument for a single appellate judge rather than a panel of three. To be sure, “correct” is likely to
be an appealing goal with respect to medical care, but it might be harder to define where judging
is concerned. For now, “correct” is taken to mean that lower courts ought to find the answer that
would be found if the appellate process ran its full course. This saves time and money. A fuller
discussion of what it means for a judge to be correct is offered in Part IV.
In fact, the second conclusion just stated is mostly wrong, and it is so in a way that reveals an
important point about additional opinions, whether by doctors or judges looking for right answers.
Counterintuitively, and as already stated, getting a third opinion when one faces a 1-1 split is no
more likely to increase the chance of correctness than that available from a 1-0 decision, because
it depends on the decision of the tie-breaker, who is no more likely to be correct than was the first
assessor. It is the search for a second and then possibly a third opinion that makes the venture
worthwhile. The advantage of a second opinion is that if it conflicts with the first, there is the
opportunity to obtain an assessment from #3, and then if #2 and #3 agree, they are more likely to
be right than was #1 alone. Put differently and with the numbers offered here, one opinion has a
67% chance (2/3) of being right, but three people, each with a 2/3 chance of being right, and
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goverened by majority rule, have about a 74% chance of being right. 9 Essentially, the reason to go
for a second opinion is that it gives one the chance to go for a third opinion and, in this way, get
the wisdom-of-the-crowd advantage of three “voters” rather than one or two. A second opinion is
of no use on its own. If the first two agree, one might as well have stopped with #1 and, if they
conflict, then one is certainly no better off with this tie vote. If there is neither time nor money for
more than two opinions, it is sensible to halt after opinion #1.10
There is no sleight of hand here. Put in terms of the numbers used here, though any reasonable
ones will do, it might pay to go to #2, assuming there will be time for #3 if needed, because there

9

There are several ways to see this striking point. If the first doctor is correct, the chance of it being
overruled by the other two is very low (1/3 x 1/3 = 1/9, if each is 2/3 likely to be right). And if the first doctor
is wrong, the chance of being overruled by the next two is fairly high (2/3 x 2/3 = 4/9). The first doctor is, by
assumption, more likely to be right than wrong, but 2/3 (the chance #1 is right) x 1/3 (the chance that #2 is
now wrong) x 1/3 (the chance that #3 is also wrong, and #2 and #3 have overruled #1’s correct diagnosis) is
2/27. That is less likely than the chance that #2 and #3 will overrule an incorrect decision, as that chain of
events is 1/3 (#1 is wrong) x 2/3 (#2 now gets it write) x 2/3 (#3 agrees with #2, and the two of them overrule
#1) = 4/27. This difference (between 4/27 and 2/27 here) shows the advantage of going ahead for a second and
then sometimes a third opinion.
Another way to see this is to examine all the possible patterns, assuming there is time (and money)
for three opinions:
(a) With 8/27 probability, there is a correct 3-0 decision (2/3 x 2/3 x 2/3).
(b) With 1/27 chance, they again agree, but are all wrong (1/3 x 1/3 x 1/3).
(c) There is a 4/27 chance that #1 and #2 get it right, and #3 is wrong (2/3 x 2/3 x 1/3).
(d) Similarly, there is a 4/27 chance that #2 and #3 get it right, after #1 was wrong (1/3 x 2/3 x 2/3).
(e) There is also a 4/27 chance that #1 and #3 are correct, and #2 is now wrong (2/3 x 1/3 x 2/3).
(f) There is a 2/27 chance of two incorrect decisions by #1 and #2, while #3 is right (1/3 x 1/3 x 2/3).
(g) There is a 2/27 chance of a bad decision, if #1 and #3 are wrong, and #2 correct (1/3 x 2/3 x 1/3).
(h) Finally, there is a 2/27 chance that #1 is correct and that #2 and #3 ruin things because they are
wrong (2/3 x 1/3 x 1/3).
If the first two doctors agree, the average accuracy is 0.8; this is lines (a) and (c) compared to lines
(b) and (f), with 12 correct and 3 incorrect chances (numerators) out of 15. In contrast, if the first two
disagree, the average accuracy is .67 – lines (d), (e), (g), and (h). The numerators in those four patterns add
to 12, with 8 correct and 4 incorrect. This 8/12, or .67, is unsurprising because everything depends on #3
who is 2/3 likely to be right, just like #1. Overall, there are 20 correct results (the numerators in lines (a),
(c), (d), and (e)) out of 27 = .74 or so, which is better than stopping after #1, with his .67 chance of
correctness.
Readers with time on their hands might also see that the analysis uses 2/3 in order to come close to
the maximum benefit of three voters rather than one. With different numbers, it is even less advantageous
to solicit additional opinions. As the likelihood of correctness drops closer to .5, it is less likely that
additional reviewers will improve things, and if the likelihood rises toward .99 then reviewers are again
unlikely to improve things much, because the first doctor is so likely to be correct in the first place.
Competent or exceptional review is most helpful in the middle.
10

If the assumptions seem absurd, it is because the reader is imagining a case where the first doctor
immediately turns things over to a specialist. In this case we might think of the first doctor as #0, and the
first specialist as #1. A second opinion is often recommended after this first specialist recommends a
significant intervention.
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is a 2/27 chance of improvement.11 That is not much; it is likely that soliciting a second opinion is
normally wasteful. An insurance company that does not pay for the second opinion might defend
itself with the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule.12 Still, a second opinion is worth something,
but only if it is understood as opening the door for three opinions rather than one. Doctors #2 and
#3 are more likely to correct #1’s error than are they likely to incorrectly overrule the good advice
provided by #1.
Once it is clear that it is not that a 2-1 decision is more reliable than a 1-0 decision, but rather that
three opinions are better than one, the attentive reader will question the value of a 5-4 decision, or
for that matter a 50-49 decision. Certainly, a 2-1 decision will be improved if checked by nine
more assessors, as in the case of the Supreme Court. If it decides a matter with a 5-4 decision we
might be no better off. But overall, the wisdom of nine will be better than that of three, just as three
did better than one. There is, however, a catch here. As the number of voters grows, be they doctors
or judges, and a close vote is produced, we must reconsider the assumption that each assessor is
2/3 (or some such probability) likely to be correct. A 5-4 decision is just fine because it is not very
far from the assumption of 2/3 – a 6-3 decision would be perfectly in line with that assumed
probability that a single decision-maker is correct. But a 50-49 decision is not of interest simply
because it raises the question of whether this is more or less reliable than a 1-0 decision, but rather
because it tells us that it is virtually certain that many voters were not 2/3 likely to be right; it is
more likely that many of these voters had no idea what they were doing. A very close result with
large numbers is most consistent with the idea that each had about a 50% chance of getting the

11

As we have seen, it will be of benefit when #1 is wrong and then #2 and #3 are correct ( 1/3 x 2/3 x 2/3 =
will ruin things if #1 is right and now both #2 and #3 err (2/3 x 1/3 x 1/3 = 2/27). Alternatively, we
can compare .67 to .74 in note 9.
4/27), but it
12

Of course, a well-done defense here needs to take account of the cost of a second opinion, the probability
of needing a third opinion (and its cost), then the benefit of a correct decision, and then multiplied by the
probability that the review be worthwhile – that it will do more good than harm (2/27 in this example). This
is unlikely to be standard practice, unless there happens to be a recovering statistician on the jury, on the
bench, or even in the insurance company’s boardroom. If so, there is room to be concerned about the use
of the preponderance of the evidence rule as presently constituted (a topic beyond the scope of this Essay).
The Learned Hand Rule may get the negligence calculation just right, for example, but it is doubtful that
juries think much about the probability that a given precaution will work, and especially so when it is often
useless when combined with another precaution, as is going to #3 when #2 and #1 agree. Even when one’s
own life is at stake, two concurring opinions seem more than enough for most people, even when they
concur for different reasons, and this suggests that something like the preponderance rule is in our minds
rather than a probabilistic rule with many values to be estimated. It may also, perhaps oddly, be embedded
in the minds of insurance company executives. There does not seem to be an example of an insurance
company that suggests, requires, or pays for a third or fourth opinion after #1 and #2 agree, though given
the high value of a human life, or the cost of paying for lifelong health care in the event of a disaster, it is
easy to insert numbers that make additional opinions worthwhile after a second opinion agrees with the
first. Additional opinions can also confuse things when multiple opinions conflict.
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matter right.13 We can be very confident, when ten doctors who review a case unanimously agree,
10-0, on what the patient should do next. A 7-3 vote might reassure us that our 2/3 estimate was
close to the mark, but the patient is less interested in admiring the chosen prior than in getting the
correct advice.
The discussion in this Part has demonstrated that there is some wisdom of crowds even if a 2-1
decision might simply mean that the third voter decided things, and was no more likely to be right
than the first voter (or doctor). In the case of law, it is noteworthy that an even number of jurors,
like 12 or 6, is sometimes (in civil trials in many states) asked for a simple majority vote, and this
produces at least a 2-vote margin. 14 It is easier to see that 7-5 is better than 1-0, than it is to believe
that 11 jurors were worth empaneling even when they reach a 6-5 result.
II.

Second and Third Opinions in the Judiciary

There are two good reasons not to jump to the conclusion that since three opinions are better than
one – even if just modestly so – it is correct to have three judges deciding a case on appeal. The
primary reason draws on the role of the lower court judge, and the second takes us to the difficult
question of how to think about a majority’s decision that is the product of different reasoning by
the several participants.15
When a lower court opinion is appealed, and a circuit court with three judges affirms with a 3-0
vote, we can be confident that the right result has been reached, because three, or really, four judges

13

Another complexity is that a close vote may reflect the fact that when voters know that a simple majority
will suffice, the cases they agree to hear (or, in legislatures, the bills that are pushed forward) will slide
toward a close vote, reflecting the idea of “minimum winning coalitions,” or what was once called “the size
principle.” See William H. Riker, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). The discussion in the
text avoids this by focusing on binary decisions like whether or not to take on the risk of a medical
procedure. However, the passing reference to a 5-4 decision in the Supreme Court must take case selection
into account; voters on the extreme may encourage the Court to take on the strongest cases for which a
majority vote can be assembled. The idea of an “extremist” might smack of preferences, but it is not entirely
inconsistent with the search for right answers. On the one hand, voters on the extreme should be happy to
follow the wisdom of the crowd but, on the other hand, they may genuinely think that there are issues
regarding which they are more likely to know the correct answer. The matter is discussed further in Part V.
14

Once we leave the requirement of unanimity, other issues arise. For example, one majority might vote
for liability but a different majority might vote for the particular determination of damages. See Shari
Seidman Diamond et al, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: the Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil
Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (suggesting the possibility of excluding jurors who voted against
liability from participating in the vote on damages).
15

See generally, Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social
Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 (1999). See also Saul Levmore, Reasoning and Precedents
in Appellate Courts (2022 available from author).
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have reached the same result. One can imagine a legal system that assigned greater precedential
value to a 3-0 decision than to a 2-1 decision, but most systems do not do so explicitly. In such a
system we would find a different mix of cases, and opinions would be written differently.
With this in mind, consider the situation where an appellate court affirms a decision, and where
we can apply the usual assumption that the lower court was more likely than not to get things right.
As we will see, this assumption does not much affect the arguments that follow, as they will work
whether the lower court judge is often wrong or rarely wrong. Imagine first that the lower court
judge is 70% likely to be correct, a number chosen here (not just because of typical reversal rates
but, also) because if the losing lawyer observed that this first judge is almost always right, or
always affirmed, the lawyer would be less likely to take the case on appeal.16 In a case where
plaintiff loses below, there may be some uncertainty about the size of the judgment that would
eventually be paid if the lower court opinion were to be reversed, and the case sent back to the
lower court. This adds complexity and it is set aside here, because the main results do not much
depend on it. Still, it is worth seeing that if the lower court judge’s chance of being right is absurdly
low, say 30%, and this is well known (perhaps by the previous rate of reversals or the kind of case
involved), then it is likely that an appeal will be filed. But even in this odd case, one appellate
judge, who gets things right 70% of the time, is likely to do the job. The opinion below will usually
be overturned, and a single appellate judge will set things straight without the need for a panel of
three.
But a single appellate judge may instead, or also, be of very low quality. That possibility does not
do much to strengthen the case for a panel of three, because a below-average circuit court judge,
and especially one who is inferior to the lower court judge, might just as likely be the deciding
vote on a familiar 2-1 panel. In any event, this is a minor concern, and it is noted here in order to
emphasize that the numbers chosen do not much matter.
Imagine, again and perhaps realistically, that the lower court judge is correct with a 70%
probability, and that each circuit court judge is somewhat better, with an 80% chance of getting
things right.17 Finally, to make this easier, let us specify that the judges’ chances are independent
16

If it were widely thought that the lower court was just 50% likely to be correct, the parties would normally
settle the case without incurring the cost of appellate review. The same might be said for any percentage
attached to this first judge, but the inclination not to settle is most easily understood as attached to cases
where the opposing litigants have quite different views of the chance of success. See John J. Donohue III,
Opting for the British Rule: Or, if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will? 104
HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
17

The numbers used here are designed to make the arguments clear. In the federal courts, about 10% of
appealed cases are reversed, though the numbers differ by subject matter and by what counts as true
reversals. See Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals, FEDERAL JUDICIARY, (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals; Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal
Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate
Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 659 (2008) For a careful study of a large set of cases and appeals
in state cases, see Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study
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of one another. The critical argument in this Part is that law should recognize the fact that the lower
court judge is also a valued decision-maker, so that when a question is decided by three appellate
judges, these are really the second, third, and fourth judges to consider the matter – albeit judges
who are probably more likely to be right than judge #1 in the lower court. Returning to medicine,
the family practitioner or generalist may be less trained than the expert who is consulted once a
problem is identified, but in law, the lower court judge is often as expert as an appellate judge
assigned to a case. (If the appellate judge is no more likely, or even less likely, to be correct, the
argument here is strengthened rather than weakened.) If the appellate court is 2-1 for reversing the
lower court, it is sensible to reverse, because two judges of 80% quality is better than two judges
who are 70% and 80%, respectively, likely to be correct. But the value of bringing in three judges
to check up on #1 in the lower court is much lower than that of bringing in two medical specialists
after the first specialist is consulted. If, on appeal, judges #2 and #3 agree with the lower court
judge, #1, there is no gain from involving #4. And if #2 and #3 both want to reverse #1, there is
also no point in using #4. The value of the familiar three-judge panel, rather than a single appellate
judge, is that the panel might reverse #1 by a 2-1 vote. If the first two appellate judges are split,
then #4 is of some value because of the wisdom-of-crowds but, as we have seen, this #4 is no more
likely to be correct than was #2. In short, if #2 agrees with the lower court’s #1, it is possible but
unlikely that something is gained by deploying additional appellate judges. If #3 and #4 disagree
with the two preceding judges, there is a small chance of improvement; #1 and #2 might both have
been incorrect, with probability of .3 x .2 = .06, but this is mostly offset by the .04 chance (.2 x .2)
that #3 and #4 are both wrong. With these numbers, there is just a very small chance that a 2-2
decision (including the lower court judge, #1) improves upon the much less expensive 2-0
decision. Moreover, it will very often occur that the appellate judges are unanimous in upholding
#1’s decision, in which case it is of no consequence to bring in #3 and #4 and, as it turns out, #2
also added nothing. There may be value in solidifying a new precedent, rather than just increasing
the chance of what is here called correctness, but this will often be offset by a closer vote or by the
uncertainty that #4 brings to the decision. Most objections to this argument will take the form of
pointing to the value of judges talking to one another, a feature that Condorcet asked us to avoid,
but note that nothing in the patterns offered here prevents a judge from talking to another or even
to the lower court judge. This and other objections are taken up presently.
To summarize, if we think of law as looking to reach correct decisions, and we take account of the
skill of the lower court judge, the value of making room for a 2-1 appellate decision that reverses
the lower court judge must be very small, and perhaps infinitesimal. This leads to the suggestion

of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2009) (focusing on the higher rate of reversals
from defendant appeals after jury verdicts than from bench trials and plaintiff appeals, and showing that
state court reversal rates are higher than federal court reversal rates, and in the neighborhood of 30%).
Reversals do not, of course, mean that the previous court was wrong, in the normal sense of the word, a
matter discussed in Part IV, but at least the numbers used in the text’s several examples are not wildly off
the mark. Finally, the rate of affirmance may just mean that appellate courts are deferential rather than
really indicating that the lower court was “correct.”
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that cases ought to be sent on appeal to just one judge, and if that judge decides to affirm the lower
court judge, the process might sensibly end there.18 If the two judges agree as to the outcome of
the case, but not as to the reason for this outcome, it might make sense to bring in one more judge
in order to help establish the precedential value of the decision. But this added wrinkle of judges’
agreeing on a result but not on the reasons for it, is a subject taken up elsewhere and set aside here
except to say that while there is some wisdom of a crowd, there is also some benefit to clarity, and
only a single (appellate) judge can be relied on to provide clarity with a single reason that
establishes precedent.19 In sum, a second reason to prefer one judge over three, despite the modest
wisdom-of-crowds feature of the three, is that a single judge avoids the problems faced when
combining reasons, or even preferences. Similarly, in our personal lives, it is obvious that asking
two friends for advice, rather than one, might add more confusion than clarity.

III.

Other Advantages of Multi-Member Appellate Panels

A. The value of discussion and compromise
Condorcet advanced a mathematical reason to encourage or even imagine independence among
voters, and this suggests that judges and jurors vote without consulting one another. The wisdom
of the crowd is said to be in the aggregation of individual judgments, where each individual is
more likely than not to be right (or at least not more likely than not to be wrong). But most appellate
judges would say that the ability to interact with one another leads to better decision-making than
It is tempting to ask whether, if the lower court judge’s correctness is valuable, the system might be better
off investing in two lower court judges, and then limiting appeals to cases where the two disagree, or simply
relying on the fact that litigants will be less likely to appeal after a 2-0 lower court opinion. The rule might
be that in the case of a 1-1 lower court, the more senior of the two judges prevails. The senior and second
lower court judge can simply be regarded as the first appellate judge so that the system would be equivalent
to one with an automatic appeal to a single judge, though the first “appeal” is more time consuming and
costly. It will raise the probability of a correct decision by increasing the number of voters from one to two,
and especially so if there is positive value to discussion and teamwork, but it does so by imposing the costs
associated with an automatic appeal, along with the costs of two lower court judges, who must manage to
agree or defer to the senior judge regarding various rulings in the course of the trial.
Our current practice in criminal cases could not be more different from the text’s argument in favor
of a single reviewer. In the case of collateral attacks on criminal judgments by a federal court, the lower
court decision is final unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability – indicating that there is a
substantial constitutional issue at stake. 28 U.S.C. §2553. If the lower court judge declines to trigger this
“appeal,” the matter then normally goes to two other judges in sequence, with no communication between
them. If the first of these judges issues a certificate, thus reversing the first judge, the question of
significance ends there, and the case goes to a panel of three for a decision on the merits. If the first of the
two judges declines to certify, then the second considers its importance and that judge can then trigger the
panel of three on the merits. In short, the procedure can involve as many as 6 judges, and reflects a view of
efficiency that is quite different from that reflected in the text.
18

19

See Saul Levmore, Reasoning and Precedents in Appellate Courts (2022 available from author).

12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036778

would separate consideration and blind ballots. We learn from one another as teammates,
identifying errors while changing our opinions because of good arguments and observations that
others bring to the table. On the other hand, a significant literature warns of group-think as well as
the tendency to submit to a bully or a charismatic figure.20 Participants may actually be more likely
to hear one another out when a 3-2 divide appears early on, than when a group begins with 5-0
perspective. Either way, as readers with committee experience know, there is a tendency to
compromise or be agreeable, until the committee emerges with a unanimous vote. A hard-working
committee knows that the larger group, or principal, to whom they report, is far more likely to
accept the committee decision if there is not a significant difference of opinion among committee
members. Judicial panels share many of these features. The agents want their hard work to be of
value. Moreover, unless one is regularly in the minority, it is advantageous to have a norm that a
vote within the group will often be reported as a unanimous decision.
Condorcet’s theorem does not claim that consultation necessarily makes things worse; it leaves
open the possibility that a very skilled individual might be better than a group, and also th at a
group might benefit from an exchange of views. This is especially so when the group is not very
large. Similarly, judges on a panel reviewing a tax case are are likely to defer to a colleague who
is an expert in that subject. Only a simplistic reading of Condorcet suggests that jurors should be
isolated from one another in order to make sure that they vote independently. There is probably no
universal answer to the question of whether to choose independence or consultation, and especially
so when the group is small. An auto repair shop might be more reliable when kept unaware of an
earlier assessment by another shop, while judges may be more likely to reach the correct answer
through consultation. We learn from and yet are swayed by one another.
There is an inherent paradox in this matter, and it arises in jury deliberations as well as in
committee work, a topic discussed further in Part V. The puzzle is that a strict belief in the wisdom
of crowds has voters behaving independently, and yet when a given, contemplative voter sees that
a majority of other voters leans one way with respect to a question with a correct answer, the
wisdom-of-crowd logic suggests that even the informed, contemplative voter should now abandon
her own inclination and go along with the majority of the group, for it is likely to be correct. This
might be a reason to insulate voters from one another, because if too many voters follow this logic
the wisdom of the crowd will be lost. This is especially the case when votes are taken one-by-one
around a room, as later voters are inclined to be influenced – and logically so – by their
predecessors. It may also be a good reason for the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and unanimity
requirements governing many juries. A juror who is still thinking about the evidence, and now
observes 10 or 11 voters preparing to convict the defendant, or find in a civil case that a defendant
was negligent, may sometimes go along with the overwhelming majority because of social
For an interesting discussion of the literature, and law’s response to it, see Roland Bénabou, Groupthink
in Organizations and Markets, 80 REV. ECON. STUD., 429, 431 (2013) (using a model to explain that the
reason societies set up mechanisms like free speech and whistle-blower protection is because groups would
want to "ignore or 'kill' the messengers of bad news").
20
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pressure or some intuition about the wisdom of crowds. A secret ballot may best elicit the true
wisdom of the crowd, but it is also more likely to lead to a hung jury.21 Juries may be inclined to
compromise in order to reach unanimity or to enjoy the community experience, but this is not
something anticipated by Condorcet, who dealt with bilateral decisions (guilt or innocence). In any
event, the relationship between compromise and the wisdom of crowds is discussed further in Part
V in the context of committee work, where the discussion considers the likelihood that the
dissenting voter is understood to be more confident than her teammates.
B. The significance of the assigned probability of being correct
The examples offered thus far appeared to depend on the probabilities (of correctness) assigned to
the first and then to any subsequent reviewers. A conventional objection to the idea of a single
appellate judge is that the ubiquity of multiple appellate panels suggests that they are the product
of an efficient evolutionary process. This is consistent with the idea of the wisdom of crowds; we
want to be more certain that an appellate court gets things right because it is assigned the power to
set precedents, and precedents are themselves efficient because they help avoid the cost of
repeatedly inventing the wheel. The current system puts judges with superior skills on these courts
and then uses panels of 3, and eventually one of 9, to raise yet further the chances of correctness.
But as we have seen, 2-1 is only better than 1-0 when viewed at the start; once we have two judges
who disagree, the third is no more likely to be correct than the first. And then once we take the
lower court judge into account, very little is gained by having a third and fourth judge.
Experimentation with different probabilities advances the case for a single reviewer in the first
round of appeal. Begin with the unlikely case in which it is the lower court judge who is most
likely to be right as to the outcome of a case, so that the reason for the familiar three-judge panel
must be to tap into the wisdom of the crowd. If the first opinion comes from someone who is very
good, then a single reviewer certainly can make things worse rather than better. In the extreme,
imagine a case where the first judge is 90% likely to be correct, and then the second opinion is
requested from someone who is only 40% likely to be correct. We can continue to assume that #3
and #4 (if called upon) are typical, and correct with .8 probability, a number previously assigned
to all appellate judges. The first two judges, #1 and #2, will often agree, and this is the case whether
#1 was in fact right or wrong. When they are both correct, the judge with correctness of .9 is
followed by .4. When they are both incorrect, .1 is followed by .6. In neither case will additional
judges be called upon. With these rather stark numbers, there is a 42% chance (at least when there
are appeals) that we will use just two judges and very often (36/42) that will lead to the correct
result. But it will often happen (58%) with these numbers that #1, the lower court judge, and #2
disagree, with #2 trying to reverse #1. Most of the time (.9 x .6 compared to .1 x .4) this is
21

See Robert F. Holland, Improving Criminal Jury Verdicts: Learning from the Court-Martial, 97 J. CRIM.
LAW 101, 120 (2006) (discussing the relationship between secret ballots and hung juries, and then
suggesting that this hung jury “problem” is avoided in US military trials in part because of a supermajority,
rather than unanimity, requirement for conviction).
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unfortunate. In these cases, we might have a rule that the matter now goes to #3 or, coming close
to the long-standing practice of a panel of 3, to #3 and #4. Infrequently, #1 was wrong and #2
actually improved things (.1 x .4), and we need only fear the unlikely event that #3 and #4 are both
wrong (.2 x .2). The more attractive and more plausible sequence is where #1 was correct, and now
#3 and #4 will undo #2’s mistake on appeal. But with these numbers it will still happen fairly often
that at least one of #3 and #4 will have a bad day, as they are both right .8 x .8 of the time.22 With
a 2-2 decision, #1’s correct decision is overruled because the lower court judge is assumed –
incorrectly in this case – to be less “accurate.” The court in which #1 sits is even referred to as the
“inferior court.” This example is meant mostly for amusement, because we like to think that judges,
like doctors, are more likely to be right than wrong, so that the case of the hapless #2 can be
ignored. Still, if the first judge is excellent and the appellate judges are only competent, there is
room for trouble. If, for example, #1 is 90% likely to be right, and the higher court’s judges are
(each) only 60% likely to be right, then we need a 3-0 decision to have confidence that we have
improved things when the appellate court overturns #1, or we need a majority decision from a
larger appellate court. This is fairly intuitive. If one starts out by going to the world’s expert to
seek help with a troubling medical condition, it is unlikely that getting a second opinion is
worthwhile. The basic idea is by now familiar. The more the first opinion is likely to be correct,
the less value there is in a second opinion. And if #2 agrees with a competent #1, it is very unlikely
that bringing on more reviewers is worthwhile, and especially so if there is no reason to think that
#3 and #4 will be much superior to #2. We can already intuit that the reason not to stop (in some
cases) after #3 is that the wisdom of crowds might be important in contradicting the expert #2.
On the other hand, if it is #1 who is often wrong, as might be the case if lower court judges are
expert in managing witnesses and juries but not in applying or interpreting the law, then a second
opinion is surely a good idea. Judge #2 will often, and correctly, overrule #1. But here too, if #2
agrees with the lower court’s #1, it is not terribly likely that bringing on more reviewers is
worthwhile. First, #3 and #4 may disagree with one another, as there is a decent chance that one
of them will be wrong. If they disagree, we might as well have stopped with #2. Alternatively, #3
and #4 may agree, but their input is only worthwhile where #1 was correct and #2 was incorrect,
and this confluence of events is quite unlikely. The key idea is to value #1’s judgment and to see
how unlikely it is that a skilled #1 and a yet more skilled #2 will be correctly overcome by #3 and
#4. The resources currently spent on panels of three are better spent elsewhere, or even on getting
more cases to appellate courts (beginning with just one judge), and then, at most, only when that
judge reverses #1 should the matter be sent on to additional appellate judges, #3 and #4. In sum,
the argument against the current system of three judges working each appeal is not terribly
sensitive to the assumptions made about the likelihood that a given judge in the chain is correct.23
22

The numbers do matter here, and the argument in the text is yet stronger if the appellate judges are correct
with .7 probability, rather than .8. They will then both be right less than half of the time.
23

The argument would be stronger if the cost of each review were specified. It is, however, hard to estimate
these costs, as well as their benefits. There is the cost of each judge’s time, the litigation costs for the parties,
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A more radical proposal is that things should never go past #2, but this would depend on the
probability that #2 is better than #1. This is like saying that when a generalist recommends an
expert, the patient might be comfortable relying on this single expert who is, after all, not really
reviewing a previous decisionmaker.24
There is added complexity if the putative appellate judges do not share a probability of correctness.
The argument was that #2 was (most often) randomly chosen from the pool of appellate judges, so
that it is fair to think about the average judge. But perhaps the reason for a panel, as well as the
initial opportunity for appeal from judge #1, is that the system recognizes that there are some lesser
judges who all too often arrive at the wrong answer to a legal question. The discussion here tries
to take account of this in the example where #1 was excellent and #2 inferior, but perhaps the
system is designed for the case where #1 frequently errs, and then #2 alone would do little good
because #2 also happens to be an inferior judge. One response to this defense of appellate panels
of three, is that the better way to deal with a bad employee, not to mention two error-prone
employees operating in tandem, is not to bring on more employees but to keep track of employee
performance and encourage the poor performers to exit, even if they have life tenure. In any event,
the suggestion here works reasonably well even if #2 alone is often wrong. That judge will often
disagree with #1, and we can bring in an additional judge, setting aside the most radical version of
the argument advanced here.
C. Why not a panel of two?
The central claim here has been that we should start out with a single appellate judge, in large part
by taking into account the likelihood that the lower court judge is correct. But if is too radical to

and the benefit of a better precedent for the future – which is probably the most difficult thing to estimate.
Moreover, much depends on what is at stake in the given case. An important constitutional case or a private
law case with an enormous amount at stake, might make a small increase in the likelihood of finding the
correct answer worthwhile. The text slides pass these points both because the costs and benefits are difficult
to estimate and because some of these are surely considered when a yet higher, or en banc, group decides
to hear a case.
24

A more complete conclusion is that (1) One should go to a specialist before agreeing to a risky
procedure. (2) If that doctor suggests a risky, serious procedure, it pays to go for an additional, or second,
opinion only if: (a) the second doctor is more likely to be right than the first, or (b) it will make the patient
feel better when the two doctors agree. It is, however, hard to put a value on emotional comfort, and of
course the cost of greater comfort reflects an insensitivity to the overall costs of health care and insurance,
as well as the increase in stress if the two doctors disagree. Finally, (c), it also pays to go to a second
specialist if one has the time and resources to go for a third opinion if #1 and #2 disagree. The advice
should not be "get a second opinion," but rather "get a second and third opinion unless the second opinion
agrees with the first one that you have already received." By way of review, the reason to go for a second
opinion is that it gives one a chance to go for a third opinion, and three are more likely to be right than
one. In the case of law, however, a panel of three along with a lower court of one, means that we have
four experienced minds at work. It only pays to bring on a third judge if #2 disagrees with #1 or, when #1
and #2 agree, then if both #3 and #4 are correct and more likely to be right than the first two judges. This
is a weak defense of the three-judge appellate panel.
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stop after one appellate judge, why not save resources by limiting further review to the use of #3,
after #2 tries to reverse the lower court judge, #1. As we have seen, the major reason to engage #3,
and even the conventional #4, is to overwhelm #2 when that judge disagrees with #1. The more
we think that appellate judges are more likely to be right than lower court judges, the more we
might as well stop after #2. If the power of precedent is at stake, so that it is worthwhile to bring
on #3 when #1 and #2 disagree, then why bother proceeding to yet another appellate judge. Perhaps
a panel of two appellate judges is a good compromise between one and three.25
An argument against this partial retreat from the central argument of this Essay, is the recognition
that cases are brought on appeal not from a randomly selected sample of lower court opinions, but
precisely when a lawyer thinks that #1 was incorrect.26 The lawyer can also be seen as an informed
voter. If appeals are in this way brought when #1, the lower court judge, is more likely to be wrong
than is usually the case, then relying on #2 alone to review #1 is attractive. If #2 affirms the lower
court, we are done. If #2 reverses the lower court, this Essay has suggested that #3 serve as a tiebreaker.
A better reason to prefer an additional reviewer, in this case #3, is to take account of the likelihood
(nearly rejected earlier) that interaction improves the chance of a group’s reaching correct
decisions. When #1 and #2 disagree, the question is apparently a difficult one, and in just such a
case we might want not only the wisdom of a crowd, but also the value of discussion that #2 and
#3 would bring to the table. If the two agree, there is also an improved chance of creating a lasting
precedent.
IV.

“Correct” Decisions

A great deal of the analysis here builds on the assumption that there is a correct answer sought by
judges, much as doctors are asked whether to proceed with a serious medical intervention. In some
areas of law this is a questionable assumption. Law may be intensely political, so that judicial
decisions are a matter of political preferences rather than correct answers. If, on the other hand,
judges are out to determine the will of an ambiguous legislature, past or present, or the will of the
politicians who nominated and approved their appointment, or even what is good for society, there
is likely to be a correct answer, even if it is hard (ever) to know whether a judicial decision was
correct. Similarly, if “correct” should refer to social welfare or ethical values, it is again difficult
to know when a judge is correct, though there might well be a correct answer. This is much more
complicated if different judges have different notions of what is correct, even if they are
determined not to let their own preferences get in the way of the agreed upon target.

25

An alternative and less dramatic possibility would be to follow the earlier logic and bring in #4 only when
#2 and #3 disagree, after #2 disagreed with #1.
26

This idea was introduced by Steven Shavell, supra note 2, and used to explain the different investments
in lower and higher courts.
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Fortunately, most of the arguments in this Essay do not much depend on how we think of
correctness. The most useful approach may be the somewhat circular one: A judge is correct if
further review, whether by a higher court, a comparable court, or by others on a panel, affirms the
judge’s decision. A judge who regularly tries to reverse #1, and is then over-ridden by judges #3
and #4, can be thought of as having erred, if only because of the wisdom of crowds. Similarly, a
judge who is regularly reversed by a higher court or an en banc review has not made correct
decisions.27 This judge imposes substantial costs on the system. One practical lesson is that we
might pay more attention to reversal rates, which are already well-known, and encourage judges
to retire or to change their thinking if they are much more frequently incorrect (defined this way)
than are other judges.28 An easier, and certainly more up-to-date-teaching, approach is to praise
the judges who are most frequently affirmed.
A reasonable objection to the approach taken here is that preferences, and especially politics, play
a more important role than the pursuit of something called correctness. This is especially the case
if we think of judges as devoted to their political preferences. This view is supported by evidence
that a judge appointed by one political party behaves differently when placed on a panel with two
other judges associated with the same party.29 In constitutional interpretation cases, this may
certainly be true. Similarly, some judges are thought to have a taste for or against large
corporations, agencies, unions, prosecutors, and environmental concerns. A judge with one of
these habits might be identified by the deference given to these entities or concerns. The good
news is that this does little damage to the arguments advanced here. Most of these can be
refashioned by substituting preferences for correctness. For example, #1 may love big business
and so it is sensible to take a business case on appeal from #1’s decision if the lower court
disappoints one’s client. The lawyer hopes to get a #2 with different preferences. But if #1 and #2
agree, there is nothing gained by going to #3 unless the judiciary is known to be stocked with the
set of preferences the lawyer seeks. But from the legal system’s perspective, and with a roughly
equal mix of preferences, if the first two judges disagree, perhaps because they have different
preferences, then bringing on #3 (or #3 and #4) adds little because the deciding vote is just as
fallible as was #1’s in the first place. On the other hand, a 3-0 vote is probably reassuring, because
as we approach unanimity with a growing number of judges, it is less likely that pure preferences
determined the result, so long as the composition of the judiciary reflects some mix of preferences.
This observation returns us to the idea, or passing suggestion, that there is something to be said for

27

Shavell is skeptical that rates of reversal mean much, in part because parties can settle cases before appeal,
and they do so with some information about the likelihood that the lower court was incorrect. See Shavell,
supra note 2, at 414.
28

Information on appeals outcomes for district and circuit court judges is compiled by WestLaw. Recall,
however, the likelihood that lawyers filter out cases where an affirmation is likely.
29

See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies
for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 854 (2008) (exploring earlier findings about
the results from politically mixed panels).
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assigning more precedential value to 3-0 decisions. Part V offers something of a contrary
argument.
An irony here is that the case for including the lower court judge’s decision is now even stronger
than before, because while circuit court judges (and certainly Supreme Court justices) appear to
be nominated with politics and preferences in mind, this is less so for trial court judges.30 In any
event, many lawyers will agree that while constitutional cases attract much attention, court dockets
are not filled with constitutional and antitrust cases, where we might also think preferences play a
greater role than correctness. Moreover, if we define “correct” to include the likelihood that the
vote will not be overturned by other judges, then again most of the arguments here remain firm.
V.

Committees, Boards, and Juries
A. Delegation to committees

Committee work in universities, in law firms, in most business settings, and perhaps even in
Congress, saves time, and encourages committee members to invest effort because there is less of
a collective action problem than if a larger group moves ahead without any delegation to its agents.
A committee of three or five might be useful both when a correct answer is sought and when a
larger group’s preferences are amalgamated. As already noted, but not proved or examined
empirically here, it is probably the case that a unanimous committee is less likely to be second
guessed than is a divided one. Indeed, in private settings it is often the case that committees do not
have an odd number of members, not only because the chair-person has a decisive vote (in formal
settings, the chair usually has a deliberative vote and then also a tie-breaking vote, or casting ballot,
as it is called) but also because the committee is expected to reach something of a consensus, even
if it does so by compromising. In turn, the committee members will know that their work is more
valuable if they come to an agreement. In legislatures, committees are often divided along party
lines, but in many other settings casual observation suggests that unanimity is common.
Unanimity might come about through compromise, inasmuch as the members know that
compromise is the easy path to unanimity and therefore time not wasted. It might also come about
through an intuition about the wisdom of crowds. If J sees that her colleagues, K and L, favor
giving an academic prize to A rather than to B or to J’s first choice, C, J is likely to join her
colleagues in order to produce a unanimous decision in the interest of collegiality, and also because
J recognizes that her judgment might be idiosyncratic, perhaps because she favors a certain kind
30

The intuition in the text is difficult to support but it is noteworthy that political reliability appears to play
a role in the elevation of judges to the circuit courts. Elisha Savcheck et al., Taking It to the Next Level: The
Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478 (2006)
(demonstrating that district court judges’ adherence to the policy preferences of a president is one of the
strongest predictors of their being elevated to the circuit level); Stephen Choi et al., The Role of Competence
in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S107 (2015) (demonstrating that
competence is not a strong predictor of promotion).
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of work or a style of writing. If there are two prizes to be awarded, the committee is likely, when
it reports a unanimous vote, to give the more important prize to the choice of the majority, and
then to give the secondary honor to the favorite candidate of the minority on the committee.
Condorcet might prefer that the majority choose both the first and second place winners, perhaps
A and B in this example, but experience suggests that the quest for unanimity and compromise
drives the results to A and C.
At the risk of moving yet further away from a scientific approach, and introducing more
speculation, it is plausible that the quest for unanimity through compromise makes some sense. If
the JKL committee is divided 2-1, with L in dissent, and L does not quickly bow to the wisdom of
the crowd, not to mention collegiality, J and K might reason that L must be confident of his views.
If in fact J and K is each likely to make the correct decision with .7 probability, and L thinks that
in this case he is likely to be correct with .95 probability, then L ought to prevail, as JK (if
independently voting) are likely to be wrong with .09 probability (.3 x .3), while L is wrong with
just .05 probability. Of course, the parties cannot be sure how likely they are to be correct in
assessing their own or others’ skills, but it might be sensible to compromise rather than to let JK
completely carry the day.
Put differently, if L is in the minority but has no reason to think he is much more likely to be
correct than J and K, then it is reasonable for him to go along with the wisdom of the crowd, small
as it is. This is especially the case if he knows that by not doing so he will create more work for
the Dean, the Board of Directors, or other principals that asked for a recommendation. It follows
that if J and K know from experience that L acts in good faith, and still L dissents, they now have
reason to think that L is fairly sure that he is more likely to be correct than are J and K. In turn,
when the Dean or other principal, or an appellate panel, is faced with a split decision, there is
reason to think that L is fairly certain but also that J and K are not convinced that L’s assessment
of their judgment is accurate. It makes sense in this case to take the 2-1 decision less seriously than
a 3-0 decision, and it does explain why committees and corporate boards strive for unanimity. In
some settings, split opinions are sent to a larger group for more investigation. In law, we see en
banc hearings and Supreme Court review of circuit splits in just such situations. The latter has no
reason to be unanimous as it will not be reviewed, and the former might contain dissenters both
because judges tend to stick to their former opinions and because they might welcome further
review. It is interesting and probably sensible that in these further appeals, great weight is not often
given to the earlier decision by a slight majority. There is, to be sure, a selection bias here because
as we go up the ladder, cases are normally selected for review by the judges. Still, the level-two
appellate team, such as the en banc group, intuits that the wisdom of crowds favors the majority
in a 2-1 decision preceding its work, but it also knows that the dissenter must be quite confident,
for the usual inclination is to compromise in the earlier round or to give in at that first opportunity
and accept the wisdom of the crowd.
B. Jury decisions
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Juries are only somewhat like committees. The common supermajority requirement encourages
each juror to pay attention and to see that his or her opinion might be decisive. Corporate boards
and most committees involve repeat players who have reason to work toward a consensus and to
trust one another. The supermajority jury may encourage similar behavior among one-off
participants. The supermajority requirement, especially for the most serious cases, also makes it
more likely that the group will find, or be seen as finding, the correct answer.
An interesting thought experiment involves converting the familiar jury into something that offers
a second opinion.31 Imagine the choice between a jury of 12, that must reach a unanimous decision,
and a scheme that divides the group into two sub-juries of 6. In a criminal case, conviction would
require that both sub-juries choose to convict by a 6-0 vote. Would the defendant prefer this
arrangement over the familiar one that requires a 12-0 vote? The sub-groups of 6 would probably
encourage more participation by each juror. A defendant might not like the sub-group approach
because a single juror who is thinking of fighting the group and holding out against a conviction,
might give in and figure that if her contrarian reasonable-doubt is justified, it will be emerge in the
second sub-group, now considering the case in another room. The single juror need not feel that
the weight of the decision is on her alone. On the other hand, a defendant might prefer the sub group approach, because it is more difficult to stand up against 11 peers than to do so against 5.
Jury size does not seem to greatly affect the likelihood of a hung jury, 32 but of course the idea here
involves two sub-juries, so there is the complication that at least one of them will fail to reach a
decision. These are important questions but they do not carry over easily into the design of
appellate review, because judges are repeat players and can see whether their decisions are
followed by later and higher courts.
Conclusion

31

The idea here is not entirely a thought experiment because multiple juries have been understood as an
option where there are multiple defendants in the same or similar cases. Judge Posner in In re High Fructose
Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 361 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2004) wrote:
“The power to [empanel multiple juries] in a civil case, if there is such power, has, to our
knowledge, been exercised only once, in Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654
(D.Colo.1980). But the existence of the power has not been denied, and we cannot see what
there is to bar it. No rule, principle, precedent, statute, regulation, or other source of
limitations on the power of district judges stands athwart the procedure that the judge
would like to employ. Fundamental to a judge's role as the presiding officer at jury trials is
the administration of the rules of evidence in a way that will minimize the likelihood that
the jury's verdict will be a product of confusion or inappropriate emotion. Imaginative
procedures for averting jury error, as long as they do not violate any legal norm, are to be
encouraged rather than discouraged. The procedure the able and experienced district judge
wants to employ is orthodox in criminal cases; we cannot see why it should be unacceptable
in appropriate civil cases.”
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Barbara Luppi & Franceso Parisi, Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox, 42 J. LEGAL. STUD. 399.
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There are many moving parts, not to mention debatable assumptions, in the analysis offered here.
The strongest conclusion concerns the structure of appellate review, and the conclusion is often
strengthened when the assumptions are tested. Unless we think that lower-court judges are very
often wrong and that there are a significant number of appellate judges who would also, with
regularity, reach the wrong decision if asked for a second opinion, it is probably a waste of
resources to have appeals go to a panel of three judges. It would be better to have appeals go to a
single judge. It might (or might not) be worthwhile to bring on additional appellate judges if the
first two judges disagree. A compromise is to bring on an additional judge if the first appellate
judge chooses to reverse the lower court, or perhaps if there is reason to think that the precedential
value of a decision will be enhanced by involving more judges. This conclusion holds even if there
is disagreement about the nature of a “correct” answer in law and, at least arguably, even if judges
do better when they discuss cases in teams. Most significantly, it draws on, rather than ignores, the
wisdom of crowds.
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